OpenBiSea v3 Security Audit | Callisto Network

OpenBiSea smart contract security audit, conducted by the Callisto Network Security Department during June 2022.

OpenBiSea v3 Security Audit Report

Are Your Funds Safe?

Summary

OpensBiSea smart contract security audit report performed by Callisto Security Audit Department

Website: https://openbisea.io/
Telegram: https://t.me/openbisea_en

1. In scope

Commit 4c1b355a32618c0ddbac83e66b353bb1803454bc

AbsNFT.sol
AbsNFT1155.sol
IOpenBiSea.sol
IOpenBiSeaAuction.sol
IOracle.sol
OBS.sol
OpenBiSea.sol
OpenBiSeaAuction.sol
Oracle.sol
StakingOBS.sol

1.1 Excluded

Standard OpenZeppelin contracts were excluded from audit:

@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Counters.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/extensions/ERC721URIStorage.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/extensions/ERC721Enumerable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/IERC721Receiver.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/IERC721.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/extensions/IERC721Metadata.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/extensions/IERC1155MetadataURI.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/IERC1155Receiver.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/IERC1155.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/structs/EnumerableSet.sol

2. Findings

In total, 3 issues were reported including:

- - 0 high severity issues.
  - 0 medium severity issue.
  - 3 low severity issues.

In total, 5 notes were reported, including:

- - 0 notes.
  - 0 owner privileges.

No critical security issues were found.

2.1 Known vulnerabilities of ERC-20 token

Severity: low.

Description:

OpenBiSea Token (OBS) has known vulnerabilities of ERC-20 token:

It is possible to double withdrawal attack. More details here.

2.2 Anybody can mint AbsNFT tokens

Severity: note.

Description:

The function mint() has no restriction and alow anybody to mint AbsNFT tokens.

This ability may be used by scammers to create new token with tokenUri of another token on this contract. However tokenId of both tokens will be different.

2.3 Owner privileges

Severity: owner privileges.

Description:

1. The owner of AbsNFT1155 contract can:
  1. Set and change URI.
  2. mint tokens.

1. The owner of OBS contract can:
  1. mint
  2. burn OpenBiSea Token to/from any account.

1. The owner of StakingOBS sale contract has right to withdraw any amount of tokens from contract included users’ staked tokens.

2.4 High gas consumption when use `contractsWhitelisted`

Severity: low.

Description:

Functions that work with contractsWhitelisted use loop for to go throw entire list of contracts to check if contract is whitelisted. This operation required the more gas the bigger list is.

Recommendation

Create mapping(address => uint256) public indexOfContractsWhitelisted; and use it get index of whitelisted contract instead of for loop. Start index from 1.

2.5 High gas consumption of function `contractsTokenIdsListUpdated`

Severity: low

Description

Functions that work with contractsTokenIdsListUpdated use loop for to go throw contractsTokenIdList. This operation required the more gas the bigger list is.

Try to avoid loops when work with array without limits of length.

3. Security practices

Open-source contact.

The contract should pass a bug bounty after the completion of the security audit.

Public testing.

Automated anomaly detection systems. – NOT IMPLEMENTED. A simple anomaly detection algorithm is recommended to be implemented to detect behavior that is atypical compared to normal for this contract. For instance, the contract must halt deposits in case a large amount is being withdrawn in a short period of time until the owner or the community of the contract approves further operations.

Multisig owner account.

Standard ERC20-related issues. IMPLEMENTED. It is known that every contract can potentially receive an unintended ERC20-token deposit without the ability to reject it even if the contract is not intended to receive or hold tokens. As a result, it is recommended to implement a function that will allow extracting any arbitrary number of tokens from the contract.

Crosschain address collisions. ETH, ETC, CLO, etc. It is possible that a transaction can be sent to the address of your contract at another chain (as a result of a user mistake or some software fault). It is recommended that you deploy a “mock contract” that would allow you to withdraw any tokens from that address or prevent any funds deposits. Note that you can reject transactions of native token deposited, but you can not reject the deposits of ERC20 tokens. You can use this source code as a mock contract: extractor contract source code. The address of a new contract deployed using CREATE (0xf0) opcode is assigned following this scheme keccak256(rlp([sender, nonce])). Therefore you need to use the same address that was originally used at the main chain to deploy the mock contract at a transaction with the nonce that matches that on the original chain.
Example: If you have deployed your main contract with address 0x010101 at your 2021th transaction then you need to increase your nonce of 0x010101 address to 2020 at the chain where your mock contract will be deployed. Then you can deploy your mock contract with your 2021th transaction, and it will receive the same address as your mainnet contract.

4. Conclusion

The audited smart contract can be deployed. Only low severity issues were found during the audit.

It is recommended to adhere to the security practices described in pt. 4 of this report to ensure the contract’s operability and prevent any issues that are not directly related to the code of this smart contract.