Pyxis Network (PYX) security audit, conducted by the Callisto Network Security Department during March 2021.


Pyxis (PYX) Specificities


Audit Request

Pyxis Network smart contract security audit report performed by Callisto Security Audit Department.


  • PYX


Pyxis Network (PYX) Smart Contract Security Audit Report

Are Your Funds Safe?


1. In scope

Commit 864c59458a2b22b22f57b9df92e931dee8260dd3

  • CMPSReservation.sol
  • CMPSToPYXSwapper.sol
  • CMPSToken.sol
  • ETHAutoStaking.sol
  • PYXStaking.sol
  • PYXToken.sol
  • interfaces/IAutoStaking.sol
  • interfaces/ICMPSToken.sol
  • interfaces/IPYXStaking.sol
  • interfaces/IPYXToken.sol

1.1 Excluded

The smart contract use open source library from Openzeppelin. Following files was excluded from audit:

  • @openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol
  • @openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol
  • @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol
  • @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol
  • @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/structs/EnumerableSet.sol

Interface contract of Uniswap Router:

  • @uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router02.sol

2. Findings

In total, 6 issues were reported including:

  • 2 low severity issues.

  • 1 notes.

  • 3 owner privileges.

No critical security issues were found.

2.1. The known vulnerability of the ERC-20 token

Severity: low.


Following EIP-20 specifications:

Lack of transaction handling mechanism issue. WARNING! This is a very common issue and it already caused millions of dollars losses for lots of token users! More details here.


Add the following code to the transfer() function:

require( recipient != address(this) );

2.2. Default Admin Role

Severity: owner privilege.


The contract deployer gets DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. This means that he can grant any roles to any addresses. It makes the smart contract more centralized and is risky if that private key will be compromised.

  1. When you revoke SETTER_ROLE in the function init() it does not guarantee that settings could not be changed in the future because a user with DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can grant SETTER_ROLE to any address and change the settings again (may call the function init()).

  2. A user with DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can grant MINTER_ROLE to any address and mint unlimited CMPS tokens and burn CMPS tokens from any address. The same according to PYX tokens mint and burn too.

Code snippet:

  • Revoke SETTER_ROLE:



2.3. SETTINGS_MANAGER_ROLE can be assigned only by Default Admin

Severity: owner privileges.


In the contracts PYXStakingETHAutoStakingPYXToken the SETTINGS_MANAGER_ROLE can be assigned only by the user with DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. As was pointed in 3.2. the user has unlimited power which is risky if his private key will be compromised. We suggest to use SETTINGS_MANAGER_ROLE_ADMIN instead DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to assign SETTINGS_MANAGER_ROLE rights.


Add constant: bytes32 public constant SETTINGS_MANAGER_ROLE_ADMIN = keccak256('SETTINGS_MANAGER_ROLE_ADMIN');

In the constructor replace:

_setupRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, msg.sender);


_setupRole(SETTINGS_MANAGER_ROLE_ADMIN, msg.sender);

2.4. Users with SETTINGS_MANAGER_ROLE can change constants.

Severity: owner privileges.


The constants for calculation formulas (like rewards calculation, penalty calculation, etc) can be changed at any time by the user with SETTINGS_MANAGER_ROLE. This means that the calculations may differ from those indicated in the white paper.


Use hardcoded constants instead of variables.

2.5. EnumerableSet is undeclared – compilation error

Severity: note.


You are using library EnumerableSet in the contracts PYXStaking and PYXToken but does not import @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/structs/EnumerableSet.sol. It cause compilation error.


Add import '@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/structs/EnumerableSet.sol' into PYXStaking and PYXToken contracts.

2.6. The function getNumDayInWeek() may returns wrong day number

Severity: low.


The results of function getNumDayInWeek() depends on value of SETTINGS.STEP_SECONDS. It will returns correct day number only if SETTINGS.STEP_SECONDS = 86400.


To remove this dependence better to use hardcoded value: return (block.timestamp / 1 days) % 7;

4. Conclusion

The audited smart contract can be deployed. Only low severity issues were found during the audit. Investors have to pay attention to high owner privileges.


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